



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.

PART II.

EARLY the next morning I sent for Colonel Jordan, and gave him the notes I had prepared in the night, as to the order of march from Corinth to Pittsburg Landing, and as to the manner in which our attack should be made. These notes served as the basis of the General Order of march and battle, issued on the 3d, as Special Orders No. 8. General Johnston signed the same, as is certified to by General (then Colonel) Jordan, "without modification in a single particular." The fact is, it was agreed between General Johnston and myself, the day after his arrival at Corinth, that all orders relative to preparations for the intended movement against the enemy, as well as for all details of organization, should be left entirely to me. And it was to facilitate the carrying out of this agreement, that Colonel Jordan, my Chief of Staff, became, upon my own recommendation, the Adjutant-General of our united forces.

To dwell upon the contents of the elaborate order of march and battle, referred to above, and upon the preliminary steps taken in compliance with it, would consume more space than I can command in the pages of this Review. Should more minute information on the subject be desired, it can be obtained by examining the original papers prepared at that time, and which are given in full in "The War of the Rebellion ; a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies," Series 1, Vol. X, Part I, p. 392; and also in "The Military Operations of General Beauregard," Vol. 1, Chap. XIX, pp. 270, *et seq.*

At the request of General Johnston, and before Special Orders No. 8 were published and copies thereof forwarded to the Corps Commanders and to General Breckinridge, I explained, verbally, to Generals Bragg, Polk, and Hardie, in the presence of General Johnston, at my own head-quarters, the general plan of operations

as suggested by me, and the details of the whole forward movement to be executed in accordance therewith. It was well understood then, that the troops would be marched from Corinth, at the hour appointed—12 meridian—before reception by the Corps Commanders of Special Orders No. 8, and that copies of the same would be distributed to them on their way to the front.

It may "seem evident" to a few friends of General Johnston, that he also had prepared a plan for the projected battle against the Federals at Pittsburg Landing, and that his purpose was that the Confederate assault should be "by columns of corps,"—not, as was the case,—by "an array in three parallel lines of battle."* If such a plan was ever devised by General Johnston, he expressed it to no one; gave no instructions to carry it out; and has left no document—not a written line—to prove that such a thought had ever occurred to him. What purports to be "his plan" of battle, as "summed up" in a telegram forwarded by him to President Davis, on the 3d of April, 1862, is but a synopsis of the strength of General Buell's army; of the position of the three Confederate Corps in their line of march to the front, and of the names of their Commanders. It is clearly no plan at all. The plan that eventually became his, is the plan contained in Special Orders No. 8, and in the Circular entitled, "Memorandum for Officers," which bore the same date, namely, April 3d, 1862. I suggested both of them, and caused both to be written. General Johnston merely adopted them, as Commander-in-Chief of our united armies. It is evident that, though suggested by me, neither of them would have issued from Department head-quarters, had General Johnston not given them his sanction. To that extent, therefore, General Johnston did have a plan of battle, namely, the plan of battle conceived by his second in command, and adopted and endorsed by him.

Our forces should have been ready to move, on the 3d of April, at 12 meridian, at the latest. Such, however, was not the case. Orders had been misconstrued, owing to which delays had occurred that caused the rear columns of the First Corps to file out of Corinth at nearly dark on that day. Fully six hours had thus been lost. The march, on the 4th, was unsteady, irregular, and slow; and when the troops bivouacked that evening, they were not more than ten miles from their starting point. True, the roads followed

* See Col. W. P. Johnston's article in "Century Magazine" of February, 1885, page 620.

were extremely narrow, and traversed a very thickly-wooded country; and it had rained abundantly, which materially increased the difficulties on the way. There was another rain-fall on the morning of the 5th; and most of the men, unused to marching, even on good roads, were all the more retarded by it. Added to those drawbacks, so serious under the circumstances, it had also happened, on the 4th, that part of the cavalry attached to General Bragg's corps, had made a reconnoissance, without authority, it was said, from its immediate commanders—with none, assuredly, from the Commanding General—which assumed such proportions, and created such a disturbance on the way, as to render it next to impossible that the enemy should not have been apprised of the advance of our army.

The formation of our lines of battle was not completed until late on the afternoon of the 5th. It had actually taken us upwards of two days to go over a distance of less than eighteen miles.

As soon as it became certain that no engagement on our part could begin that evening, General Johnston invited his Corps Commanders, and the Commander of the Reserves, as well as myself, to an informal conference, near his head-quarters, which were, at that moment, less than two miles from the enemy's line of encampments. There it was ascertained that most of our men were already without rations; and that the transportation wagons, with the extra rations and extra ammunition, were still far in the rear, with no certainty of their soon coming up with the troops.

When I understood the true condition of affairs, which, it will be admitted, was far from promising, I told General Johnston and the other officers present, that, anxious as I was to carry out the aggressive movement, I had, with their co-operation, striven so hard to bring about, I was not certain but that the delays we had met with on our march, and the lack of food threatening the army, and, added to these, the boisterous and regretful conduct of some of our cavalry the day before, had not already frustrated the object we had in view upon marching our forces from Corinth, namely, to reach our present position, take the enemy by surprise, and especially and above all, give him battle before General Buell's junction with General Grant. I plainly stated that, in my opinion, it were hardly possible to believe the enemy ignorant of our presence so near his lines. That vigilance on our part should be taken as proof of vigilance on his. That such being the case, we would likely find the enemy intrenched and ready to meet, with troops

flushed with recent victories, the gallant but as yet undisciplined forces we had marched against him. That none could be more sorely disappointed than I was, at seeing the great purpose we were about to execute probably lost to us through accident and mismanagement. But, that prudence, and a due regard to the safety of the army for future operations, compelled me to say, that I no longer favored an attack, but now preferred inviting one from the enemy, and thus change our offensive movement into a reconnoissance in force ; the result of which might bring him nearer to our base and, therefore, farther from his own, and give us, eventually, the chance of retrieving the present lost opportunity.

My remarks were listened to with much attention both by the Corps Commanders and by General Johnston. He admitted the correctness of my views, but said that he still hoped the enemy would be unprepared to meet our onset, and that we could accomplish our end before the arrival of General Buell's army. That our troops were in line of battle at last, and it were better "to make the venture." The order was therefore given to begin the attack at dawn, the next day, according to the plan already agreed upon.

In adopting this course, General Johnston did what he had the unquestioned right to do. I will only say, that he thereby assumed a responsibility which, under the circumstances, I would not have assumed.

It has been stated, in an article published in the "Century Magazine" of February last, to which I have already had occasion to recur in these pages, that, upon leaving the conference just spoken of, General Johnston, turning to one of his staff-officers, said: "I would fight them if they were a million." It is also stated, in the same article, that my proposition then "suddenly" given, was "that the army should be withdrawn and retreat to Corinth;" * * "that General Johnston seemed to be much surprised at the suggestion;" that "Polk and Bragg differed with Beauregard (me), and a warm discussion ensued between him (meaning me) and Polk, in which General Johnston took little part," etc.* These statements I pronounce entirely erroneous. First, General Johnston was too wise a man and too good a soldier, to make the foolhardy remark attributed to him. On the other

* Col. W. P. Johnston's article in the "Century Magazine" of February, 1885, page 622.

hand, his whole conduct prior to his arrival at Corinth, and his reason for yielding to my suggestion of an immediate advance on Pittsburg Landing, namely, to take advantage of General Buell's absence at the time, showed most unmistakably that the fact of attacking one army alone, or two armies combined, was, by no means, immaterial to him. Next, what I said during that conference led to no discussion among the officers there assembled, and to no surprise. The eventualities of war are too great and too numerous to give rise to any such feeling among educated soldiers. Nor was I acting without precedent: "Somewhat similar strategy had been resorted to by Wellington in 1810, when, advancing to attack Massena at Santarem, he unexpectedly found that able officer on his guard, ready for battle, on ground of his own choosing and much stronger than he had anticipated. After making some demonstration in front of his wily adversary, to draw him away from his stronghold, Wellington did not hesitate to retire without giving battle."* And it must be borne in mind that my proposition never was "to withdraw and retreat to Corinth;" but to convert the movement I had myself inaugurated and so strenuously supported up to this moment into "a reconnoissance in force," so as to bring on an attack upon us from the enemy, instead of attacking him as projected, and thus to endeavor, by appropriate manœuvres, to draw him from his base, as already stated, and produce, or try to produce, some compensating result. It was clear that I only proposed this alternative because I deemed my first plan unsafe at this particular juncture, too much time having been lost by us to justify a fair hope of success. To assert that General Johnston had prepared a plan of battle, the main feature of which was to put his army "face to face with the enemy, knowing that the *chief strategy* of the battle was in the decision to fight;"† and that the plan I had formed was merely to appear before the enemy and then retreat to Corinth, is, when set up against existing documentary evidence, a palpable subversion of facts, scarcely deserving more than a passing rebuke.

On the evening of the 5th of April, the Confederate forces, at a distance of less than two miles from the small log structure known as the "Shiloh Meeting-House," occupied three distinct lines of

* "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. 1, chap. xix, page 278.

† Col. W. P. Johnston's article in the "Century Magazine" of February, 1885, page 620.

battle. General Hardee's Corps formed the first line, extending, somewhat obliquely, over a space of nearly three miles, from Owl Creek, on the left, to Lick Creek, on the right, but without actually reaching either. It had been necessary, in order to cover the whole front, to place General Gladden's brigade, of General Bragg's Corps, at the extreme right of this line. The artillery attached to the Corps occupied a position in its immediate rear, with cavalry protecting both flanks. Nine thousand and twenty-four men, infantry and artillery, constituted its effective strength. The second line, under General Bragg, was some five hundred yards in rear of the first, arranged in similar order. Its strength was of ten thousand seven hundred and thirty-one men, including artillery, but to the exclusion of cavalry. General Polk's Corps, of nine thousand one hundred and thirty-six men, exclusive of cavalry, held the third line, and was deployed in columns of brigade, on the left of the Pittsburg road, its front being about eight hundred yards rearwards of General Bragg's left wing. Each brigade had its own battery; and there was cavalry protecting the extreme left of this line. General Breckinridge's command, in rear of General Bragg's right wing, occupied a position somewhat similar to that of General Polk's Corps behind General Bragg's left wing, between the Pittsburg road and Lick Creek, with cavalry supporting his right flank. It consisted of seven thousand and sixty-two men, not including cavalry. Generals Polk's and Breckinridge's commands constituted the reserve, and were to be thrown forward, as exigencies required, in support of the two front lines of battle. This gave a total of thirty-five thousand nine hundred and fifty-three, infantry and artillery; to which should be added four thousand three hundred and eighty-two cavalry; making an aggregate, of all arms, of forty thousand three hundred and thirty-five men. The cavalry, it must be said, notwithstanding the good element it was made of, could only be used for such outpost duty as involved no skirmishing.

We had pickets far in advance of our first line of battle, but nowhere could those of the enemy be seen; as if his lines were not guarded by outposts of any kind. Such, however, was not the case, as we discovered next morning.

As encamped, so near our forces, the Federals, on that day, occupied a position forming "a continuous line from Lick Creek, on the left, to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right,

facing nearly south, and possibly a little west.”* Their first line was held by Generals Sherman’s and Prentiss’s Divisions, extending from the bridge on Owl Creek to the Lick Creek Ford. General Sherman’s first brigade formed the extreme right ; his fourth was west of the Shiloh Meeting-House and rested on it ; his third brigade was east of the Meeting-House and also rested on it. Then began the line of General Prentiss’s Division ; and afterwards, at a long interval, was posted General Sherman’s second brigade, in close proximity to Lick Creek. Some half a mile from this line, in its rear, was McClelland’s Division, between Sherman and Prentiss. Then came Smith’s Division (now W. H. L. Wallace’s), two miles in the rear and toward the Tennessee River. On its left laid Hurlbut’s Division, on the road leading to Hamburg, a mile and a half behind Sherman’s second brigade, under Stuart.

Darkness disappeared at last before the early brightness of the morning of the 6th of April. A little before 5 o’clock A.M., on that eventful Sabbath, where the purest heaven I had seen for months, was soon to witness perhaps the bloodiest and hardest fought battle of the war, General Hardee’s pickets came against those of the enemy and, driving them in, met the main body of the advanced guard of Prentiss’s Division, when immediately began a scattering fire between the two outposts. General Hardee, thereupon, ordered forward his entire line ; and General Prentiss, hurriedly informing Wallace and Hurlbut of the attack made upon him, threw forth, first, a few regiments, and then his whole force, to resist this unexpected onslaught upon his lines. He had to give way, however, so impetuous was the shock he received, and our line, still advancing, next struck against General Sherman’s pickets, which immediately fell back toward their encampment. General Sherman now called Generals McClelland, Prentiss, and Hurlbut to his assistance ; and Veatch’s Brigade, of Hurlbut’s Division, was rapidly sent out to protect General Sherman’s left. Presently the firing increased on both sides, and continued very brisk for fully half an hour, when it gradually slackened and, before seven o’clock A.M., had almost entirely died out. But our assailing line was still moving onward, and the enemy still losing ground before it.

It is singular that notwithstanding the evidence furnished by all Confederate and many Federal authorities, some northern

* General Grant’s article in the “*Century Magazine*” of February, 1885, page 597.

writers and northern generals persevere in the idle assertion—idle because it has been proven groundless—that the Federal forces were not taken by surprise at Shiloh on the 6th of April, 1862. I, myself, for reasons already referred to in this paper, had deemed a surprise improbable; but that it was effected is, nevertheless, a fact. I will merely say this:

On the evening of the 5th of April, our army, amounting to some forty thousand men, was within a mile and a half of the Federal encampments. We had formed our lines of battle in the woods fronting these encampments. We had remained there a whole night, using but few precautionary measures to conceal our presence. We had moved on the next morning within easy sight of the enemy, without encountering any obstacle worthy of notice. When the first encampments were taken, many Federal officers and soldiers were yet lying in bed. Bread was being baked and was taken hot from the ovens by our men. Sutlers' stores were left wide open. Whole companies ran from their quarters, without having time to take their muskets or rifles with them. Our first columns of attack entered the first Federal lines as freely and as unimpeded as if by invitation. This alone is sufficient to prove a surprise in the fullest sense of the word. But this is not all. In Van Horne's "*History of the Army of the Cumberland*,"* the following passage occurs:

"A variety of facts support the assumption that neither General Halleck, General Grant, nor the division commanders on the field beyond Pittsburg Landing, had the remotest expectation that the enemy would advance in offence from Corinth with full strength. General Halleck proposed to command the united armies in their advance at Corinth, and yet was not to leave his headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, until the 7th."

On the 5th General Sherman sent this telegram to General Grant at Savannah:

. . . "I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our position."

General Grant on the same day telegraphs General Halleck as follows:

. . . "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place. . . . It is my present intention to send them (meaning Buell's three foremost divisions) to Hamburg, some few miles above Pittsburg, when they all get here."

* Vol. I, pp. 103 et seq.

And on the same evening (April 5th) General Grant, being then at Savannah, and addressing Colonel Ammen, who commanded a brigade of Nelson's Division, Buell's Army, said :

"You cannot march through the swamps ; make the troops comfortable ; I will send boats for you Monday or Tuesday (7th or 8th), or some time next week. There will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing ; we will have to go to Corinth, where the rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us, we can whip them, as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Donelson."*

Further evidence to the same effect can be found in "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. I, chap. xxii, pp. 331, et seq.

At dawn of day I had ridden to General Johnston's headquarters, to advise with him about our respective action in the impending battle. It was agreed between us that he would lead the attack on our right, and that I would supervise the movements of the field and direct the reserves.† When the firing became heavier he mounted his horse and rode forward. This was our last meeting.

By that time the battle had fairly opened. To study its progress and follow its phases, I took the position which General Johnston had requested me to take, and which, as first in command, he should have occupied himself, near the center and in rear of our line ; and, from the spot he had just left—which was called by me "Head-Quarters No. 1"—I sent instructions and orders to various portions of the field, as, in my opinion, the exigencies required. Thus, at 7:30 A. M., I ordered Generals Polk and Breckinridge to deploy in columns of brigades, the former on the left, the latter on the right, and to be ready to move at a moment's notice, to assist either General Hardee's or General Bragg's line, or both, if it became necessary. And I freely availed myself of the services of every member of my personal and general staff all through the day, to convey messages and orders to corps commanders and others, and to keep me well informed of the precise conditions of affairs in our front.‡ Adjutant General Jordan I sent forward,

* See Col. Jacob Ammen's Diary, in "War of the Rebellion," Series I, vol. x, Part I (Reports), page 330.

† In "The Life of A. S. Johnston," p. 570, is given the following statement of Col. Jacob Thompson, formerly a volunteer A. D. C. to General Beauregard: "General Johnston determined to lead the attack in person, and leave General Beauregard to direct the movements of troops in the rear."

‡ See, in "Military Operations of General Beauregard," Appendix to vol. I, chap. xx, pages 524 et seq., reports of Colonels Brent, Ferguson, Augustin, Jacob Thompson, Major Waddell and Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm.

with instructions to inspect our lines of battle, "secure the massing of the troops for unity of attack and prompt reinforcements to weakened points; also with impressive directions to the corps commanders to mass their batteries in action, and fight them twelve guns on a point." *

To fill the space between Lick Creek and the right of General Hardee's line, Chalmers' brigade was ordered from the second line of battle and, with a battery, brought on the right of General Gladden, as prescribed by the order of march and battle. A very hot contest followed, during which General Gladden was mortally wounded, and died on the same day. His services had been invaluable; his conduct on the field worthy of the highest praise. Colonel Adams succeeded him, and, with General Chalmers, made so gallant a charge on the right, that Prentiss' whole line broke and retired in confusion. Just then came up, through a previous order of mine, Johnston's brigade, of General Polk's corps, as additional reinforcement to General Hardee's right. This being done, at about 9:30, I moved to another position, near the Pittsburg road, "about a quarter of a mile in advance of the Shiloh Meeting-House," † which was called "Head-Quarters No. 2."

The pillaging of the enemy's abandoned camps, and, therefore, the straggling of our men, had already begun. ‡ Upon being informed of the fact, I ordered members of my staff, aided by Captain Dreux, of my escort, to clear the camps thus invaded, collect the stragglers found in them, and send them on to their respective commands in front. There was much difficulty in executing these orders. This alarming feature was a source of great trouble to me, and brought back to my mind the remarks I had made at our Conference the evening previous: "Nature has claims that cannot be disregarded. The best disciplined troops do not fight well on empty stomachs. And this is all the more true of raw troops, unaccustomed to the hardships of war."

General Ruggles's command, composed of Gibson's, Anderson's and Pond's brigades, had formed on General Hardee's left, to contend with General Sherman, who had not yet been dislodged from

* Same work, vol. I, chap. xx, p. 285.

† Major Waddell's Report—"Operations of General Beauregard," vol. I, chap. xx, p. 531.

‡ Reports of members of General Beauregard's staff, in Appendix to vol. I, chap. xx of same work, pp. 527-530, 534.

his position at Shiloh, and who was striving hard to maintain it, aided by McClelland's entire division, and a regiment belonging to one of Wallace's brigades. An interval had occurred between Gibson's brigade and the two others, which was filled by the opportune arrival of one of General Polk's brigades—Russell's—ordered forward by me, some short time previous. He supported Hindman's assault upon McClelland and Veatch; and greatly contributed, with Hodgson's battery and, later on, with two sections of Ketchum's, to force General Sherman to fall back to the Purdy and Hamburg roads, and, by ten o'clock, to abandon the entire line of his camps.*

The battle now raged with renewed fury on W. H. L. Wallace's and Hurlbut's front. Colonel Adams, with Gladden's brigade, had been sent to feel the enemy's strength. At this moment, and while Adams, for want of ammunition, was unable to move forward, Breckinridge's division was led into position by Colonel Augustin, of my Staff; and Cheatham's division, which I had ordered to the same quarter, came up also, and took a stand on the left.† Both engaged the enemy at the same time and with equal impetus. But the forces under Wallace and Hurlbut showed much stubborn resistance, and did not, just then, lose their ground. They were well handled and behaved in a manner highly creditable to themselves and to their Commanders.

All the opposing forces were now engaged. Our front line had been extended, right and left, and the troops of our second line, and those composing the reserve, occupied it at different intervening points. General Johnston, changing his position in rear of Withers's division, came over, at about eleven o'clock, to the rear of Breckinridge's Division. A little before this, by agreement between Generals Bragg and Polk, the former took his stand near the right center of our line, the latter near the left center, and General Hardee remained near the extreme left. I continued to occupy a medial position on the line, towards the rear, in order to follow the general movements of our troops, in accordance with General Johnston's desire.

Learning, at about one o'clock P.M., that the forces under Sherman and McClelland showed signs of weakness and were about to give way, I ordered General Hardee to push on the cav-

* Col. Buckland's Report, Rebellion Record, Vol. IV., p. 372.

† General Cheatham's Report.

ally against their retreating regiments, and to endeavor to cut them off from their line of encampment. This was done with great dash, and General (then Captain) Morgan, gave proof, on that occasion, of what could be expected of him in the future. By my order, another vigorous assault was made by General Hardee, upon Sherman's and McClelland's commands, which were rapidly driven back, the larger portion of them toward Snake Creek, and the other in the direction of Wallace's camps. My Head-quarters had again been advanced by this time, and were now beyond General Wallace's captured camps.*

The Confederate left was next engaged with General Wallace's division, now become the advanced Federal right, which had resolutely held its own and repulsed all assaults made upon it. General Bragg had spent more than three hours in a stubborn yet powerless endeavor to force it to give way. There was Gibson's brigade repulsed, after making four unavailing assaults, insisted upon by General Bragg, who now passed further to the right, leaving the responsibility of this portion of the field to a Staff Officer, with authority to act in his name.† General Johnston had been, for nearly three-quarters of an hour, in rear of General Breckinridge's division, which was, at that time, the advanced right of the main Confederate line. The firing was unusually heavy in that quarter; and General Johnston was astonished at the resolute resistance encountered there. After causing General Breckinridge to "appeal to the soldiers," and after doing so himself,‡ he ordered a charge, which he led, in person, with his well known valor, and during which he was wounded in the leg, without at first realizing the extent of his injury. The Federal line thus charged had slowly and reluctantly given way, retiring to the next ridge beyond; but the temporary advantage we had gained was dearly bought by the death of the General-in-Chief, a gallant soldier and noble citizen, whose life, had it been spared, would have been of inestimable value to his country. General Johnston died in the arms of Governor Harris, of Tennessee, one of his volunteer aids, at about 2.30 o'clock P.M.

* Major Waddell's Report, in "Military Operations of General Beauregard," Vol. I., Appendix to chap. xx., p. 531.

† General Bragg's Report. "Rebellion Record," Vol. X., Chap. XXII., p. 466.

‡ Col. W. P. Johnston's article in the "Century Magazine" of February, 1885.

Immediately after, General Johnston had been wounded, and before being apprised of it, Adjutant-General Jordan, who had just arrived in that quarter of the field and had found General Breckinridge's division not in action, ordered it, in General Johnston's name, to charge the Federal forces in its front, which were screened by a fence at the entrance of a wood. The movement was successfully effected, after a hard struggle on both sides, and the enemy at last fell back, abandoning the position he had held.

Meanwhile, my attention being turned to that portion of our line near the center, where General Bragg had vainly endeavored to dislodge the enemy about an hour before, I ordered General Hardee to gather what force he could dispose of, for another advance in that quarter. I was not yet aware of the death of General Johnston. General Hardee obeyed, and sent forward the remnants of Anderson's and Gibson's brigades, with two batteries of artillery, and several battalions organized as such by members of my Staff, who had collected them from stragglers, and commands which had lost their proper positions in line. Colonel Smith's Crescent Regiment, of New Orleans, was added to these troops; and, as it passed me to join in the movement, was urged on by me with the following words: "Go forward, men, and drive them into the Tennessee!" A serious and well disputed contest ensued. The enemy finally yielded, losing ground more and more. But Prentiss and Hurlbut, further to the right, were still successful in their resistance to the forces under Breckinridge and Cheatham. Jackson's and Chalmers' commands were called, and came to their assistance, under a raking fire from Lanman's brigade. I was, at that time, in advance of McClernand's camps, directing operations at that point. There it was that, shortly after three o'clock P.M., Governor Harris came up and informed me of General Johnston's death.* However deeply grieved I was at this distressing news, the struggle just then was too hot and the result as yet too undecided, to allow me either time or opportunity to express all my regret. Messengers were hurriedly sent by me to the Corps Commanders, to inform them of what had occurred, and to urge upon them the necessity of concealing the fact from the troops; and, feeling all the more the weighty responsibility resting upon me, I gave orders that the attack be continued and pushed forward with the utmost vigor.

* Col. Wickliffe, of Gen. Johnston's Staff, brought the same news. I cannot now say whether he came before or after Governor Harris.—G. T. B.

It is but true to state here, that never from the opening of the battle up to the hour of his death, had General Johnston occupied on the field the position which was properly his own, as Commander-in-Chief of our forces. From the place he had himself selected on our line, and where he remained to the last, he was but acting the part of a Corps or Division Commander, and as such, uselessly exposing his person. From where he was, he could not—nor in fact did he ever attempt to—direct the general movements of our forces. That most important trust devolved upon me, the second in command, and I performed it throughout the whole day, before, as well as after, the death of General Johnston.

What troops remained of Hindman's and Gladden's brigades, with the forces under Breckinridge and Cheatham, were now pressing Wallace's left. General Bragg was hotly assailing Prentiss's and Hurlbut's commands. Jackson and Chalmers were engaged with Hurlbut's front and left flank. Hurlbut now fell back, and the course he followed allowed Jackson and Chalmers to strike in flank the line held by Prentiss and Wallace. The space occupied by the two latter was being narrowed, more and more, around them. At that time, General Hardee, on the left, was confronting the remnants of McClellan's and Sherman's commands. Here also, and in spite of the resistance shown, the enemy was gradually falling back, in conformity with the retreating movements of the other Federal forces. Wallace was now mortally wounded. He died that day. The Federals lost in him one of their ablest and most gallant commanders. Prentiss alone, it appears, did not follow in time the rearward movement of Wallace's division. He was not warned in season and clung to his position, until surrounded from all sides, he was compelled to surrender, with all that was left of his command, an aggregate of some 2,500 men, and among them General Prentiss himself. This took place at 5.30 o'clock P.M., about three hours after General Johnston's death.

The continuous fighting, marching, countermarching and manœuvring of the troops all day long—and that mostly without food—finally produced the most telling effect upon them. Almost every position of the enemy was carried. His lines of encampments were taken. The Tennessee River was in sight, on several points of our line. We had captured small arms, guns, flags, and upwards of three thousand prisoners; but the victory, none the less, was not wholly ours. It was far from being gained when General

Johnston fell ; it was not completely gained in spite of all that was accomplished after his death. Straggling among the men, which had begun before noon, had now assumed fearful proportions. And worse even than straggling, was the fact that the men in front, who had never been out of action, were absolutely outdone by the need of food and by fatigue. To deny this is either to confess utter ignorance of what took place on the battle field of Shiloh, or to show wanton intent to subvert the truth.

Notwithstanding this state of things, I determined to again deploy our forces into line for a concerted onslaught, before it were too late, and did my utmost, with the assistance of the corps commanders, to successfully carry it out. The attack was made ; but it was desultory, without spirit or ardor, and failed in effect.

There was an additional reason for our failure in this last advance upon the enemy ; it was the massing of Colonel Webster's "reserve artillery," consisting of some sixty guns (among them several 24-pounder siege guns), which had been placed along a ridge overlooking Pittsburg Landing, and were powerfully assisted by the two gunboats "Tyler" and "Lexington." Supported by the remnants of Wallace's, McClernand's, and Hurlbut's divisions, and by Colonel Ammen's brigade, of Nelson's division (Buell's army), which had arrived on the field a little after 5 o'clock P. M., these guns and gunboats enfiladed the limited stretch of broken and thickly wooded ground over which our troops had to pass in their assault, and did much to impair the success of their efforts.*

It was 6 o'clock P. M., just before sunset, when I ordered the cessation of hostilities, so that our forces could be withdrawn for rest, and thus avoid confusion in their rearward march. But, before that order was received by the corps commanders—and in many cases before it was issued—the contest had already virtually ceased on the greater portion of the field. It is absolutely errone-

* . . . "We were immediately in the rear of our line, the enemy had fallen back to Pittsburg Landing, and their gunboats were keeping up a furious shelling. Our men, immediately in front of where we were standing, were much demoralized, and indisposed to advance in the face of the shells which were bursting over us in every direction ; and my impression was (this was also the conclusion of General Bragg) that our troops had done all that they would do and had better be withdrawn."—Extract from a letter written by Dr. Nott, of General Bragg's staff, to General Beauregard. See "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. I. Appendix to chap. xx, page 535.

ous to state that some of the subordinate commanders were preparing another concerted movement, and that it was prevented by my order to stop the fight. No one on the hard-fought field of Shiloh had the hope of victory more at heart than I had. The entire conception of the campaign had been mine; and I had directed the general movements of the troops throughout the day. But human endurance has its limits; and to quote the language of General Bragg, not as found in his Report, written more than three months after the battle of Shiloh, but as used by him while leaving the front on the 6th of April with his exhausted men:

*"They had done all that they would do and had better be withdrawn." **

It was dusk when the troops began to leave the front to bivouac for the night. Many of them left after darkness had set in, and, on that account, got separated from their commands. General Chalmers, in his official report, says:

"Our men . . . continued to fight until night closed the hostilities on both sides. . . . They were too much exhausted to storm the batteries on the hill"

Colonel Urquhart, one of the members of General Bragg's personal staff, in a letter to General Jordan on this point, says:

When . . . "this order was given, the plain truth must be told, that our troops at the front were a thin line of exhausted men, who were making no further headway, and were glad to receive orders to fall back."

A mass of evidence, collected with care from Federal and Confederate reports, could be accumulated here to sustain what I have just stated. I refrain from lack of space.†

Later in the evening, some of the corps and division commanders visited my head-quarters, established in what had been one of General Sherman's tents, near the Shiloh Meeting-House. General Bragg was among them. They showed and expressed much satisfaction over the triumph of the day. No one intimated, directly or indirectly, within my hearing or that of my staff, that the order to cease firing and fall back to the captured camps of the enemy had been given too soon, or that it should not have been given at all. They were well aware that, though masters of the field, our vic-

* Dr. Nott's letter already quoted. The whole of it can be found in "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. I, Appendix to chap. xxii, page 535.

† See "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. I, Appendix to chap. xxii, pp. 547 et seq.

tory had been incomplete ; but acknowledged that the troops had done all that could be expected of them. The hope was entertained by all present, that, upon resuming the offensive the next day, we would complete our work, and accomplish the end we were striving for. I handed to General Bragg and to the other officers there a dispatch I had just received, to the effect that some of the divisions of Buell's army were marching toward Florence and not to Pittsburg Landing. Unfortunately this news proved to be false. The troops referred to were of Mitchell's Division, not then with Buell's army.

Having now instructed the corps commanders present, and sent orders to the others, to look to the comfort of their jaded troops and reorganize them for the next day's events, we separated for the night, and I retired to my temporary quarters to seek some rest, of which I was greatly in need.

I do not propose to give more than a cursory description of the second day's fight at Shiloh. "Monday," it has been said, "was General Beauregard's battle."* It was, unquestionably ; but not more than the battle of Sunday ; for the reason that I directed the general movements of the army on both days.

Skirmishing began early on the morning of the 7th. Gathering the forces that were at hand, Generals Hardee, Bragg, and Breckinridge hurried to the front to meet the enemy's onset. On the extreme right of our line was General Hardee, with Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades, of Bragg's Corps. General Bragg was at the left, with the remainder of his command, and Clark's Division, of Polk's Corps, and, shortly afterwards, Trabue's Kentucky brigade. General Breckinridge was on the left of General Hardee. Between the former and General Bragg was a vacant space, assigned to General Polk, who had not yet made his appearance on the field. He arrived later in the morning, to my great relief, and promptly falling into line, led his men under fire with his wonted coolness and gallantry.

On the other hand, Nelson's division, next to the river, formed the left of the enemy's front line. On his right came Crittenden ; then McCook, whose division was the extreme right of General Buell's command. General Lew Wallace, with his fresh troops

* Col. W. P. Johnston's article in the "Century Magazine" of February, 1885, page 628.

which had arrived late the evening before, was on the extreme right, near Snake Creek. The other Federal forces, gathered from the broken commands of the first day's battle,—namely, Sherman's, McClernand's and Hurlbut's—were on the center.

The first Confederate pickets that came in contact with the enemy, that morning, were from Forrest's cavalry. They retired in good order toward General Hardee's line, and sought, and found, shelter behind it. Nelson's advancing columns were soon confronted by Chalmers' brigade, with Colonel Moore's regiment, and a mixed command made up of troops from Jackson's and Gladden's brigades; added to which were the Crescent Regiment, of New Orleans, and the 26th Alabama, with batteries to support them. Nelson's forces were compelled to fall back, but, at about eight o'clock, advanced a second time, being now reinforced by Hazen's brigade. Our troops began to give way and, while doing so, lost one of their batteries. They soon rallied, however, and, at nine o'clock, again took the offensive, with the assistance of other batteries, and of reinforcements opportunely sent by me. Their first position was finally recovered, and the lost battery was theirs once more. Hazen's brigade suffered considerably in that encounter, and came very near falling into our hands. Ammen's brigade was also closely pressed, and would have been turned on its left, had it not been for the timely arrival of Terrell's battery, of McCook's Division.

After Nelson's, Crittenden's Division was engaged with General Hardee's forces and a part of General Breckinridge's. A hot contest ensued, in which, at about 10 o'clock, some of General Grant's forces, under McClernand and Hurlbut, took an active part. This whole Federal force was kept at bay, for several hours, and until two brigades of McCook's Division were sent to reinforce it. It then began to gain ground, our troops slowly giving way;—not, however, before I had resolved to retire from the field, and thus put an end to a useless loss of life and material.

It was evident that General Buell's arrival, with three divisions of his army, was an accomplished fact; and that my depleted forces were now confronting some twenty thousand fresh troops, exclusive of Lew Wallace's Division, aggregating about seven thousand men, and exclusive also of what remained of General Grant's troops of the day before, which amounted to not less than twenty thousand men;—though it is doubtful whether much

more than half that number actively participated in the battle of Monday. Deducting our losses of the previous day, and the stragglers, amounting to thousands, I never had, ready for duty, and with musket in hand, on the 7th of April, more than twenty thousand men—and at one o'clock P.M., not even sixteen thousand, exclusive of cavalry; which, owing to the nature of the ground, and as General Grant himself admitted, “could not be used in front.”*

Our left had been seriously threatened, at about one o'clock P.M. General Bragg's forces at that point, weakened by the withdrawal of three brigades to reinforce our right and center, were closely pressed and unable any longer to hold their ground. He called on me for aid. I ordered the 18th Louisiana and the Orleans Guard Battalion—now blended into one command—and remnants of an Alabama and a Tennessee regiment to be immediately sent to him, and, going on with them as they passed, led them myself in the charge. General Bragg thereupon resumed the offensive, and the enemy fell back some distance beyond the Shiloh Meeting-House. I had established my head-quarters, early in the morning, at that central point of our lines, where I remained, undisturbed, until nearly 2.30 o'clock P. M.

All the Confederate troops confronting, on the 7th of April, the forty thousand Federals arrayed against them—about twenty-seven thousand of whom were composed of fresh troops—had fought hard, from early dawn to late in the evening of Sunday. Exhausted as they were, they fought again on the 7th, with such spirit and endurance, as to justify me in saying of them in my preliminary report to the War Department: “From the outset our troops, notwithstanding our fatigue and losses from the battle of the day before, exhibited the most cheering, veteran-like steadiness.”

There was now but one course to pursue. It was, while inducing the enemy to believe in a determination on my part to continue the contest, to quietly prepare for a timely and honorable retreat. I acted with much caution and abstained from communicating my intention to the corps commanders and, even, at first, to my Chief of Staff. Since nine o'clock in the morning, however, I had sent messengers to Corinth, to inquire as to the arrival of General Van

* General Grant's article in “*Century Magazine*” of February, 1885, page 600.

Dorn. I knew it was problematical, but was loath to begin any retrograde movement, before that last hope of relief had failed me. Meanwhile I caused reinforcements, made up of stragglers and disjointed commands gathered from the rear, to be hastened to the front, as fast as they could be found ; and, strange though it may seem, these became the only *reserves* I could dispose of to strengthen my thinned ranks, and with which the unequal contest then going on was prolonged for more than four hours, with no sign of decisive advantage on the part of the enemy.

When, at last the news was brought back that Van Dorn and his forces had not arrived, and that not even his whereabouts could be ascertained, I began seriously the difficult work before me ; difficult, because it had to be done without weakness or hesitancy, so as neither to make it appear a defeat in the eye of the enemy, nor a cause of discouragement to our overwrought troops. I despatched an aid to the rear, with a squadron of cavalry, for the purpose of clearing and preparing the roads for the passage of the army. I also instructed Adjutant-General Jordan to select, at once, a convenient spot across the first ravine, toward the rear, and there to station infantry and artillery, to protect our line of march, as the troops would be leaving the field. The corps commanders were then made aware of my plan ; and, while taking the necessary measures to carry it out, were ordered to resume the offensive on divers points of the line, with a view to keep our adversary in ignorance of the true motive of our movement. They very ably executed the orders given them ; and the retreat was begun by 2.30 P. M. and effected leisurely, quietly, and with much regularity.

General Breckinridge's command was the first to retire ; the troops, right and left of his position, closing up the space it had just occupied. It was marched to the rear of the force collected by Colonel Jordan, and there halted, as agreed upon, to act as a rear guard. General Polk's corp came next ; then General Hardee's ; and lastly, General Bragg's. There was no flurry, no useless haste, among men or officers ; and even the stragglers dropped into line and rejoined their commands as they passed. No pursuit whatsoever was attempted by the enemy. In fact, the Federal troops that had fought the day before were as much outdone as our own. Generals Grant and Sherman acknowledge it in their reports. The former even stated, later on, and caused it to be published, that, though desirous of pursuing the retreating army,

he "had not the heart to order it to men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in mud and rain, whenever not fighting." * Such was not the case, however, with the three divisions of General Buell's army. These were made up of fresh troops, though it is well to state that they had done most, if not all, of the fighting on Monday. But no order to pursue was given to General Buell. General Grant seems to have been diffident about it, and had not yet acquired the habit of giving orders to General Buell. †

General Breckinridge, in command of the rear guard, bivouacked on the night of the 7th at a distance of not more than a mile and a half from the battle-field. No hostile force of any kind, not the crack of a rifle, nor the sound of a bugle, disturbed his rest. On the morning of the 8th he moved his force three miles further to the rear, and remained in that position for several days without being attacked or even annoyed in any manner whatever.

General Sherman, however, on the lower Corinth road, and General Wood (of Buell's army), on the upper road, with two brigades each, did venture on a reconnoissance on the morning of the 8th, which was far from being a success. They came across our cavalry pickets, posted where General Breckinridge had bivouacked the previous night, and, being in such number, easily drove them back, sending two regiments, one of infantry and one of cavalry, to press them further rearward, and capture them, if possible. It so happened that the pursuers struck against Colonel Forrest, with a fraction of his own cavalry and a few companies under Captain Morgan, in all, three hundred and fifty men. The Federal raiders fell back in the greatest hurry, leaving on the ground some fifteen men killed, and twenty-five wounded. But Colonel Forrest followed them too far, and finally met the four reconnoitering brigades which barred his way and forced him to fall back. Colonel Forrest was very seriously wounded on that occasion, and had to leave the service for more than two months.

Our loss on both days was heavy ; but it must be borne in mind that we were the assailants during the whole of Sunday, and also, very frequently on Monday. The list of casualties stood as follows :

Killed	1,728
Wounded.....	8,012
Missing	959
In all	10,699

* "Century Magazine" of February, 1885, page 605. † Idem, page 605.

or an average "of twenty-four and one-third per cent. of those present on the field."

We carried back with us some twenty-six stands of colors, and about thirty pieces of artillery, leaving behind many more, for lack of horses to remove them to the rear. We took, besides, a large number of small arms, and, as before stated, more than three thousand prisoners.

Our forces, with the exception of Breckinridge's and Chalmers' commands, resumed the positions they occupied at Corinth on the 3d of April. The work of recruitment and reorganization was immediately begun. I applied to the War Department for two major-generals, four brigadier-generals, and a chief of artillery. I also recommended General Bragg for promotion.

During the comparative lull that followed, I was desirous of preparing a correct, final report of the battle of Shiloh, and of substituting it to the hastily written—and in many respects imperfect—preliminary report I had forwarded to Richmond. This, however, I was debarred from doing, as none of the corps commanders were ready with their own reports. These, in fact, were only prepared months after the events they described; General Polk's not until nearly one year after; General Bragg's, though apparently written on the 30th of April, was not completed before the 25th of July; that is, more than three months after the battle.* Contrary to all military usage, these reports were sent direct to the War Department, instead of being forwarded through me. Hence the errors, discrepancies and misinterpretations to be found in certain portions of them. They are not sustained by actual facts, nor by what was stated in the official reports of brigade and regiment commanders, upon which they purported to have been based.

On the 11th of April General Van Dorn's forces arrived at Memphis. I sent General Rust's brigade to Fort Pillow, and General Little's to Rienzi, some twelve miles from Corinth, for the purpose of reconnoitering, and also of selecting a good defensive position for a retrograde movement, in case of need.

Shortly after the battle of Shiloh, General Halleck took command of the Federal forces at Pittsburg Landing. They soon began to increase by the arrival of reinforcements, and, later on, of General Pope's army, estimated at twenty-five thousand men.

* I have never been able to procure that of General Breckinridge.

General Halleck must have had, then, under him, at least one hundred and twenty-five thousand men of all arms. Whereas the Confederate forces, under me, including Van Dorn's seventeen thousand men, numbered not more than fifty thousand; "daily decreasing on account of sickness," and with no hope of being reinforced.

When General Van Dorn reached Corinth, he was assigned to a position on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, on the right and in rear of our defensive lines. These extended some three miles in advance of the town, on high grounds in rear of a creek, and had been established by General Bragg, while I was still at Jackson. They were defective, especially toward the left. I corrected them afterward, but not to the extent I would have wished.

"General Hardee's corps extended along and from the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, in front of General Van Dorn's position, to the left, where it rested on the right of General Bragg, whose left in turn rested on the right of General Polk's corps, stretching across the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. The left of this command occupied some woods protected by abattis and rifle-pits, each corps holding a few brigades in reserve." *

Directly behind Corinth was General Breckinridge's command, which now, as before the battle of Shiloh, constituted the reserve.

Sickness among the troops began to be so prevalent that the eventuality of a change of strategic position, to insure the health and safety of the army, soon forced itself upon me. Such a position was not easy to find; for, while from it the enemy had to be held in check, and the country in his rear protected, including Fort Pillow, a salubrious locality and a supply of good water, so much needed at Corinth, had also to be taken into serious consideration. Grand Junction, on that account, had been discarded. But the fear of losing Fort Pillow, which was still so essential to the safety of Vicksburg, around which, by my orders, defensive works were already in process of construction, caused me, for the time being, to waive all thought of a change, until compelled to revert to it anew, by the mode of approach of the enemy in my front.

It was hard to say just when my position would be seriously

* "Military Operations of General Beauregard," Vol. 1, Chap. xxiv., p. 382.

threatened by the advance of General Halleck upon it. That he was closing in upon Corinth, more and more, every day, was an undoubted fact ; but so extremely cautious were all his movements, that one less acquainted with our respective strength might have supposed he commanded my force of fifty thousand men, and I his large army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand. Nevertheless, I dispatched several officers of trust with special instructions to look for and report upon, a good defensive position, healthy in every respect, and where an abundance of water could readily be procured. Tupelo was the place finally designated and recommended.

On the 8th of May, General Pope, whose line of encampments was near Hamburg, on the Tennessee, advanced with his entire force on Farmington, a small village, four miles from Corinth. He had undertaken this aggressive movement, it was believed, without consultation with General Halleck. Between him and General Buell, ran Seven Miles Creek, now filled by recent rains, and which completely separated him from his base. Seizing upon this opportunity, and desirous of cutting off his line of retreat, I ordered a concerted attack in full force upon his position. It was only partially successful, and failed through the inefficiency of General Van Dorn's guide, and the tardiness of one of his division commanders. As it was, however, two of General Pope's brigades barely escaped falling into our hands. Their casualties, in killed and wounded, were heavy. They also lost a large number of small arms and accoutrements.

I prepared, a few days later, another concerted movement somewhat similar to the one just mentioned, and for the same purpose ; but a series of rain storms baffled the attempt, and the troops were ordered back to their former positions. This was on the 18th of May. General Halleck was still advancing upon us, slowly but safely, and the effectiveness of our troops was daily decreasing owing to the prevalence of disease among them.

It was now clear to me that the withdrawal of the army from Corinth should no longer be delayed. That by so doing we would lose a strategic point of the greatest value, none appreciated more than I did ; but there could be no hesitation between the holding of Corinth and the safety of our forces. I called the corps commanders together, and, after fully expressing my views to them, asked that each should give his individual opinion upon the impor-

tant question under advisement. The conclusion arrived at was unanimous : the evacuation of Corinth was a military necessity.

Orders were immediately given for the removal to Baldwin, Tupelo, and other localities in the rear, of the heavy guns, ammunition, camp equipage and also of the sick. Very minute instructions were given by me to the corps commanders. They were enjoined not to speak of the projected movement ; but to spread the rumor that we were preparing for a general engagement.

The evacuation began on the 30th of May, at one o'clock A. M. The main obstacles in the way had been removed ; all the wagon-trains and all the rearmost troops were sent on ahead.

In order to impress the enemy with the belief that we were about to take the offensive and were receiving reinforcements, I caused empty trains to be run at stated times, during the night, and ordered the troops stationed near them to cheer vociferously as they arrived. The effect desired was produced, as is shown by the following telegram of General Pope to General Halleck :

"The enemy are reinforcing in my front and left. The cars are running constantly, and the cheering is immense every time they unload in front of me. I have no doubt, from all appearances, that I shall be attacked in heavy force at daylight."

It is an undisputed fact that our last files were quietly marching out of Corinth when the above was forwarded. A thin line of skirmishers and some few cavalry had been left to keep up appearances.

It was only in the morning of the 30th, long after dawn, that the enemy, who had made vast preparations to meet the anticipated attack, at last discovered the entire withdrawal of the Confederate Army from Corinth.

The retreat was orderly, in every respect, and was effected as it had been planned. An army of fifty thousand men disappeared from the immediate front of an army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand, and brought away with it its munitions of war, its stores, its sick ; and suffered no material loss of any kind. No pursuit was attempted by General Halleck. It is even doubtful whether he was aware of the direction taken by our forces, on their line of retreat. That line was, from Corinth to Rienzi, Booneville, Baldwin and, finally, to Tupelo (fifty miles south), which latter place was reached on the 9th of June. I had caused several halts to be made on the march ; the first, six miles from Corinth, behind the

Tuscumbia River ; the second, at Rienzi, and the third at Baldwin, to be ready to meet the enemy had he shown any willingness to follow ; but he did not.

The evacuation of Corinth, if not an absolute Confederate victory, was unquestionably a barren triumph for the Federals. Such was, at the time, the conclusion reached by all unbiased minds. Such is the verdict of history to-day. It saved the army from incalculable disasters. It foiled the plans and preparations of the enemy, and prolonged the contest in the South-west for more than a year.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.